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A NEW INTESTATE SUCCESSION STATUTE
FOR NORTH CAROLINA
FREDERICK B. MCCALL* AND ALLEN LANGSTON**
The property accumulated by a person during his lifetime may,
upon his death, be disposed of in one of two ways: first, in accord-
ance with the terms of a will made by the deceased and expressive
of his intent and desires regarding the ultimate disposition of his
worldly acquisitions; and second, if the deceased left no will, in
accordance with certain statutory enactments, indicative of the
legislative intent as to the proper disposition of property left by an
intestate. If a person dies leaving no will and the legislature of the
state through its intestacy statutes, or canons of descent and dis-
tribution, makes in effect a will for the deceased, it should be a mat-
ter of considerable concern for us to determine whether the legislative
regulation of the devolution of property is consonant with the nat-
ural but unexpressed desires of the decedent regarding the disposi-
tion of his property. In other words, is the legislative "will," by
and large, coincident with the probable wishes of the majority of
the people who die having made no testamentary disposition of their
goods? Recent trends in intestate legislation indicate that the answer
is in the negative, and that the general public, as well as the legal pro-
fession, is becoming vitally interested in the business of renovating
and modernizing the laws of descent and distribution. This is true
particularly in America.
Most of our states have inherited their laws of estates in land
and of intestate succession from the common law of England. Much
of this law traces its ancestry to the feudal system of land tenures.
In a rapidly changing social and economic order many of the states
are still struggling along with antiquated intestate succession acts-
laws which in some instances were enacted over a hundred years
:ago and are ill-suited to present-day conditions. But even pride
in the ancestry of these laws no longer argues for their retention,
because most of the outgrown provisions of our land law inherited
from England have been abolished by that country. In 1925 Par-
liament fundamentally changed the law of wills, the law of property,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
** Member of the Raleigh, N. C., Bar; A.B., Grinnell, J. D., University of
North Carolina.
A NEW INTERSTATE SUCCESSION STATUTE 267
and the succession of heirs and distributees. The laws enacted were
the Administration of Estates Act, the Trustee Act and the Law of
Property Act. The first named abolished dower and curtesy, made
similar the devolution of real and personal property, vested in stat-
utory trustees the entire legal estate of a decedent-both real and
personal, abolished the action of partition, modified the law of
escheat, and did away with the fiction of equitable conversion.'
These enactments became effective January 1, 1926.
While England has left most of our states far behind in the
matter of progressive property legislation, a few commonwealths in
this country have already modernized their intestacy laws and several
others have appointed commissions to study the problem and report
thereon to their respective legislative bodies. In 1917, following a
two-year period of work by a special commission appointed by the
Governor, Pennsylvania passed the Intestate Act,2 which removed
many of the historic common law landmarks from the law govern-
ing decedents' estates.. Curtesy and dower were abolished and a
substantial share in the decedent's estate was given outright to the
surviving spouse. For the purpose of disposing of the estate all
distinctions between real and personal property and between ances- °
tral and non-ancestral property were removed, thus establishing a
uniform system of descent and distribution.
On the strength of the recommendations made by a commission
appointed by Governor Smith in 1927 the General Assembly of
New York in 1929 enacted the Decedent Estate Law,3 which com-
pletely revised and modernized the laws of intestate succession of
that state. This statute, which became effective September 1, 1930,
likewise harmonized into one uniform system the rules of succession
to real and personal property; abolished curtesy and dower in prop-
erty acquired after August 31, 1930, and gave the surviving spouse
of the intestate an outright share in the decedent's estate; protected
the widow or surviving husband against disinheritance by an unjust
1 ADmINIsTRATIO" or ESTATES Acr, 15 Gm. V, c. 23 (1925). See also Re-
port of the New York Commission to Investigate Defects in the Law of
Estates, Legislative Document No. 70, p. 7 (1928). (This document will be
cited hereafter as Rep. N. Y. Com.)3 P. L. 1917, 429; Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) §§8342-8396.3Laws of 1929, c. 229; N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 13, §§80-104. For
discussions of the New York law, see Laube, The Revision of the New York
Law of Estates (1929) 14 CoRN. L. Q. 461; Twyeffort, The New Decedent Es-
tate Law of New York (1929) 6 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 377; Sullivan, The Passing
of Dower and Curtesy (1931) 19 Geo. L. J. 306; Cummins,Recent Reforms in
the Inheritance Laws of New York (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 785.
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testator by providing a right of election to take a specific part of the
estate against the will; and concentrated the estate in the nearer and
more dependent relatives. Inspired by the example set by New
York, the Ohio legislature enacted a complete new Probate Code
effective January 1, 1932. It revamps the laws relative to descent
and distribution, 4 dower,5 and curtesy0 in accordance with the gen-
eral plan of the Pennsylvania, New York, and English intestacy
statutes.
In 1931 the president of the Florida State Bar Association ap-
pointed a committee to make a revision of the probate law of that
state. The preliminary report of this committee7 included a new
probate act which purported to redraft, revise, and simplify the en-
tire law of Florida, both adjective and substantive, regarding the
devolution and administration of estates. While Florida has long
had a uniform descent and distribution table, the law proposed in
the preliminary report embodied a unique feature (unfortunately
abandoned in the final report) in providing that the title to the real
estaie of a decedent, like personal property, should vest in the per-
sonal representative.8 This would have permitted the abandonment
of the highly technical procedure for taking possession and sale of
real estate for the payment of debts. Proceedings were also pro-
vided, with adequate safeguards for the persons beneficially inter-
ested in the estate, for the sale, lease, and mortgage of property by
the personal representative. 9
The State of Delaware, through its legislature in 1931, authorized
and directed the Governor to appoint a commission of nine charged
with the duty "to investigate and to recommend as to the advisability
of a revision of the laws of the State of Delaware affecting the de-
scent and distribution of property in intestates, the duties and pow-
ers of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees and other fiduci-
aries, and all other statutes of this state as the Commission may
deem advisable for the purpose of modernizing and simplifying the
law relating to estates and trusts and the systems for the devolution
'Baldwin's Cum. Ohio Code Service (March, 1932), §§10503-1 through
10503-22.
5id. §§10502-1 through 10502-7.
OId. §10502-8.
7 (1932) 6 F". ST. BAR AssN. J. 187.
OId. at 205, §57. As to final draft, see note 85 infra.
'Id. at 227-230, c. 4, §§197-217.
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of real and personal property, and to prepare proposed legislation for
such purposes."'10
The legislative activity just discussed is illustrative of the modern
trend-even in the older states where common law vestigia have
longest survived-toward revision and simplification of the laws of
intestate succession in this country. We shall subsequently refer
more specifically to some of the provisions of these statutes.
This brings us to a consideration of the situation in our own
state. North Carolina, always a conservative state so far as changes
in the law of real property are concerned, still clings with stubborn
tenacity to some of the antiques in its property law which it in-
herited from England as a part of the common law of that country.
North Carolina is numbered among the eleven states". in America
which still retain, subject to slight statutory modifications in case
of divorce, separation, etc., dower in its common law form. This
state, along with four others12 and the District of Columbia, still
makes provision for common law curtesy. However, as we shall
point out later, North Carolina has modified the husband's right
of curtesy initiate. Five states,13 including North Carolina, and the
District of Columbia still have, as at common law, separate statutes
of descent and distribution for real and personal property. North
Carolina also maintains the distinction between ancestral and non-
ancestral property with reference to the inheritance of real property
by collateral relations, depending upon whether or not such rela-
tions are of the blood of the first purchaser.' 4 Under the present
North Carolina law15 the surviving spouse may take as heir of the
deceased spouse, who has died intestate, only when the latter has
left none other who can claim as his heir.
The time is ripe for North Carolina to consider seriously the
proposition of abandoning these antiquated doctrines of intestate suc-
cession by regulating the devolution of property in terms of a modern
social and economic order. We are therefore submitting herewith
" DEL LAWS (1931) c. 303; see also Stockton, Modernizing Laws Govern-
ing Intestacy and Devolution of Property (1932) 54 TRUST COMPANIES 357, 363.
' Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and West Virginia.
"New Hampshire, New Jersey (except that curtesy initiate has been de-
stroyed), Rhode Island and Tennessee.
U Delaware, Kentucky, New Jersey, North Carolina and Tennessee.
"N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, Rules 4, 5, 6.
Id., §1654, Rule 8.
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a proposed new intestacy act"' for North Carolina. This act is
fashioned along the lines of similar recent legislation in England,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio; and by its terms would seem to
effect a disposition of an intestate's property more nearly consonant
with the natural desires of the deceased than do the present statutes.
In presenting the proposed statute, we shall follow the general plan
of taking up each section thereof and discussing it, so far as prac-
ticable, from three angles: (1) its historical background, (2) present
legislative trends with reference thereto, (3) changes in the present
North Carolina law that would be wrought by its adoption.
A PROPOSED STATUTE OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Section 1. The estates of curtesy and dower are hereby abolished. The
surviving spouse in case of intestacy shall have as an heir that share in the
whole estate of the deceased which is provided in Section 5 of this statute.
The purpose of this section is to delete from our law the senile
and well-nigh obsolete marital estates of dower and curtesy and to
substitute in their stead, for the benefit of the surviving spouse, an
outright share in the estate of the deceased. The states of the Ameri-
can Union, including North Carolina, which still retain curtesy and
dower inherited them from England and the feudal system of land
tenures that prevailed in that country during the middle ages when
land was the foundation not only of practically all wealth but of the
military powers of the king and the great lords as well. Since the
conditions that once justified these estates no longer existed in
England, that country abolished the inchoate right of dower as a
restraint on conveyance in 1833-a century ago-by permitting the
husband to convey and devise his real property without the consent
of his wife.17 The last vestige of dower was removed, and the estate
by the curtesy was abolished in England in 1925.18
In the United States twenty-three states19 have abolished dower-
" It will be noticed that the proposed statute contemplates changes only in
the substantive law. It is neither final in form nor definitive in nature; rather,
it is meant to be suggestive of the path to be followed in modernizing the
present laws. Such a statute was suggested for consideration at the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws held in Washington,
D. C., October 4-10, 1932. It was incorporated as the "First Tentative Draft
of a Uniform Intestacy Act" in the Committee Reports, pp. 55-58, Appendix B,
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
I7 DowEa AcT OF 1833, 3 and 4 WM. IV, c. 105.
SADmINISTRATION OF ESTATES Acr, 15 GEO. V, c. 23, §45 (1925).
"Arizona, 1901; California, 1850; Colorado, 1868; Connecticut, 1877;
Idaho, 1887 Indiana, 1852; Iowa, 1873; Kansas, 1868; Maine, 1895; Minne-
sota, 1875; Mississippi, 1906; Nebraska, 1907; Nevada, 1865; New York,
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vested, inchoate, or both. Vermont, in 1787, was the first state to
-abolish it; and Pennsylvania in 1917,20 New York in 1929,21 and
Ohio (as to vested dower) in 193222 were the last ones to put an
end to the estate. It is now under fire in several others, notably in
Delaware. In the three states of Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas
the estate of dower apparently has never been known. It is said
that a California lawyer, in discussing the problem with an attorney
from Wisconsin, once remarked: "We look upon dower and curtesy
as you do upon wager of battle and benefit of clergy." 23
Curtesy has been abolished in thirty-four states24 and apparently
never has existed in Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas. It will be
noticed that Vermont, in 1787, was also the first state to abolish
curtesy. The last state to take such a step was New York in 1929.25
Our sister state of South Carolina deleted curtesy from its law in
1883.26
It is submitted that the estates of dower and curtesy should be
abolished in this state, since not only are they unnecessary clogs upon
the alienation of land but also for the reason that they do not rep-
resent adequate provision for the surviving spouse, especially the
widow, out of the deceased spouse's estate. The right of dower
as it exists in our law today is, in most cases, a snare and a delusion.
Contrary to the belief of the average layman who thinks that the
widow acquires outright in fee simple a one-third part of her hus-
band's real estate upon his decease, she actually gets, during her
lifetime only, one-third of the income producing value of the in-
1929; North Dakota, 1877; Ohio, 1932; Oklahoma, 1890; Pennsylvania,
1917; South Dakota, 1893; Utah, 1898; Vermont, 1787; Washington, 1871;
and Wyoming, 1869. Dower was abolished in the several states on the
dates given, or at least as early as that. Rep. N. Y. Com., mpra note 1, 61.
P. L. 1917, 429, §3; PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §8352.
21Laws of 1929, c. 229, §82; N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 51, §190.
'CUM. OHIO CODE SERVICE (Baldwin, March, 1932) §§10502-1 through
10502-7.
I Baensch, Husband and Wife as Heir of Each Other (1925) 9 MARguETE
L. REV. 99.2 Alabama, 1852; Arizona, 1901; Arkansas, 1925; California, 1872; Colo-
rado, 1868; Connecticut, 1877; Florida, 1906; Georgia, 1895; Idaho, 1887;
Illinois, 1874; Indiana, 1852; Iowa, 1873; Kansas, 1868; Maine, 1895; Mary-
land, 1898; Massachusetts, 1902; Michigan, 1915; Minnesota, 1875; Mississippi,
1906; Missouri, 1921; Montana, 1895; Nebraska, 1907; Nevada, 1865; New
York, 1929; North Dakota, 1877; Ohio, 1887; Oklahoma, 1890; Pennsylvania,
1917; South Carolina, 1883; South Dakota, 1893; Utah, 1898; Vermont, 1787;
Washington, 1871; and Wyoming, 1869. Curtesy was abolished in the several
states on the dates indicated, or at least as early as that. Rep. N. Y. Coin.,
.supra note 1, 66, 67.
IN. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 51, §189.
I S. C. Acts 1883, p. 339.
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heritable realty of which her husband was seized during coverture.21
Instead of being the recipient of a portion of the land in fee, the
widow often finds herself saddled with the responsibilities of a life
tenant of non-productive realty. She is inadequately protected dur-
ing her widowhood when she most needs protection, and she may die
without sufficient funds to give her a decent burial. And, as is often
the case, a husband may die intestate leaving as the sole asset of
his estate the home place, which represents the joint savings of the
husband and wife. The widow will be entitled only to her dower
in the property, while the fee. therein will descend, if there be no
issue of the marriage, to nieces and nephews or perhaps cousins of
the husband,-collateral heirs who had nothing to do with the ac-
cumulation of the estate. North Carolina has expressly held that
where the estate consists solely of the dwelling-house, only one-third
of the value of such house, instead of the entire residence, may be
allotted the widow as her dower.28 And if the wife desires to take
the present cash value of her dower, this value will be computed
on the basis of her life expectancy according to the mortuary tables.29
This means, of course, that the older she is the less valuable will
be her dower. The fact that so many men make wills in favor of
their wives, giving them the bulk if not all of their property, shows
that the average man believes that the present laws are unfair to
the widow.30 The aforementioned New York Commission has very
well said in its first report :.1 "Under the present right of dower,
after the death of the husband, the law mocks the widow with a
mere polite phrase without any substantial benefit to her."
The abolition of dower and curtesy by our proposed statute would
remove from the law of North Carolina what seem to be unnecessary
clogs upon the alienation of land. Ownership of real property no
longer forms the basis of wealth; the emphasis has shifted to personal
property-stocks, bonds, money. While there is no law in North
Carolina that would require a husband to consult or even consider
his wife in the disposition of $100,000 worth of his personal prop-
erty, yet if he wishes to convey free from the wife's dower right a
vacant lot worth $500, or a gully-washed hillside worth nothing at
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4100; McDaniel v. McDaniel, 25
N. C. 61 (1842).
Caudle v. Caudle, 176 N. C. 537, 97 S. E. 472 (1918).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§1790, 1791.
' See (1930) Second Rep. of Com. on Revis. Ohio Probate Laws, p. 8.
' Rep. N. Y. Coin., supra note 1, p. 10.
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all, he must consult his wife, secure her signature to the deed, and
have her acknowledgment thereof and privy examination taken be-
fore the proper officer. 32 That dower is a great burden upon com-
merce in real estate is demonstrated by the fact that in some in-
stances it may be claimed at almost any time within an indefinite
period after the death, of the husband. In one case33 our Supreme
Court held that claim for dower in an equity of redemption made
nine years after the husband's death was good; that the writ of dower
being in the nature of a writ of right, would not be barred for sixty
years. And even where the wife joins in the mortgage conveyance
of her husband to exclude her claim for inchoate dower therein,
her relation to the transaction is that of surety, and should she sur-
vive her husband and the land be sold to satisfy the debt she be-
comes a creditor of his estate in an amount equal to her dower.34
But we need not multiply illustrations; the wife's right of dower,
both inchoate and consummate, is ever ready to bob up and give
trouble in our law of conveyancing.
Though North Carolina, as noted, retains curtesy in practically
its common law form (certainly as to curtesy consummate) 35 the
rights of the husband in his wife's property have been so cut down
by the Constitution, 6 by the various married women's property
statutes,3 7 and by the pronouncements of the court, that his estate
by the curtesy initiate is of little value. He has no estate whatever
in the land during coverture; unless his wife consents, he may not
collect the rents and profits, nor sell the land and give possession,
nor lease it for any term whatever, nor- can his rights therein be sold
under execution against him.38 He has the bare right of occupancy
of her land with his wife, with the right of ingress and egress, and
the right to a life estate in all her lands--curtesy consummate-should
he survive his wife and issue of the marriage has .been 'born alive.3 9
While it is true that under Article X, Section 6, of our Constitution
the husband has no real interest, not even by curtesy initiate, in his
wife's property and she may by will defeat his curtesy right after
her death,40 yet by virtue of the same article and section of the Con-
IN. C.-CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§997, 4101, 4102, 4103.
'3 Campbell v. Murphy, 55 N. C. 357 (1856).
"American Blower Co. v. Mackenzie, 197 N. C. 152, 147 S. E. 829 (1929).
"N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2519.
"N. C. Const., Art. X, §6 (1868).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§2506, 2510.
" Id. §2510.
"Taylor v. Taylor, 112'N. C. 134, 16 S. E. 1019 (1893).
,Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N. C. 947, 44 S. E. 655 (1903).
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stitution he has a "veto" power over the alienation of her realty in
the form of a withheld written assent, which, if asserted by him,
invalidates her conveyances of realty; and it is believed that he will
in some cases exercise this restraint on her alienations by virtue of
the fact that he may come into his right of curtesy consummate upon
her death intestate.
Finally, the husband cannot by will deprive his wife of dower if
she chooses to dissent from the will, 41 but, as pointed out above,4 2
the wife may, by her will, cut off her husband's curtesy right. The
adoption of our proposal to abolish dower and curtesy and to sub-
stitute in lieu thereof for the surviving spouse an outright share in
the estate of the deceased would tend to destroy this inequality. This
statement of course assumes an amendment of our present laws to
allow each spouse to dissent from the will and take his share under
the new law as in the case of intestacy.
Section 2. If either spouse shall, without the consent of the other, sell,
convey, or in any way encumber that parcel of real property, whatever its
extent or value, which at the time of the conveyance is used as the principal
residence or domicile of the family, such conveyance or encumbrance, or any
rights attained thereunder, shall not have the effect, as against the spouse not
consenting, to deprive him or her of the full use and enjoyment of all the
rights, privileges and duties of a life tenant therein for the term of his or
her natural life. Provided, that a mortgage or deed of trust given without the
consent of the spouse of the purchaser to secure purchase money or any part
thereof shall be effectual to pass the whole interest in the land according to
the terms of the instrument. In all other cases and with respect to all other
types of property the owner thereof may sell, convey, or encumber the same,
giving good and perfect title thereto, irrespective of the consent or want
thereof of his or her spouse.
There is not, within our knowledge, a law such as is here pro-
posed in force irn any jurisdiction. This section is predicated upon
the effort to get rid bf dower and yet preserve to the surviving spouse
the chief benefit supposed to accrue to the widow under the dower
right.
When every other argument for the retention of dower has been
met, its- proponents reply that whatever may be said of inchoate
dower as a clog upon commerce in land, or the inadequacy of vested
dower as a protection for the widow after the death of her husband,
it is still true that inchoate dower and the possibility that it may
IN. C. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1931) §§4096-4098.
'Supra note 40.
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become vested does actually protect the wife of an inconsiderate or
estranged husband in that it makes it impossible for him to give good
title to the family home without the wife's consent. A sale or mort-
gage is forestalled and a place of residence preserved for the wife.
This argument was put forward so vigorously in Ohio that the com-
missioners who drew up the new Probate Code for that state decided
to retain inchoate dower and the signature of the wife on instruments
of conveyance as a protection for the homesite. Vested dower, how-
ever, was abolished with reference to any property owned by a con-
sort at his decease. 43
The instant proposal is an attempt to protect the non-consenting
spouse with reference to disposition of the homesite and yet allow
complete and free alienation, by the owner, of all his other property.
The nearest approximation in the North Carolina law to this
section is the so-called "Home Site Statute," 44 which differs from
the section under discussion in that it purports to protect only the
non-consenting wife against her husband's disposition of the family
residence. Our section also protects the husband. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has experienced difficulty in satisfactorily con-
struing the present home site statute,45 ard, unless it is completely
rewritten and reenacted, 46 it probably never will serve any, useful
purpose.
This section, construed with section one, would permit the hus-
band to freely alienate all of his property, without his wife's consent,
except the homesite and the homestead (if the latter has been al-
lotted). 47 It would, of course, change the present section4 s of our
statutes which permits the husband to convey the title and right to
possession of his realty to a grantee, subject to the weife's dower right.
Considerable difficulty will be encountered when we attempt to
adjust the present law to that part of our statute which would per-
mit the wife to convey her realty without her husband's consent.
Such an adjustment would involve a change in the Constitution which
now requires for the validity of a married woman's conveyance of
'CGn. OHIO CODE SERVICE (Baldwin, March, 1932) §10502-1. See com-
ment of the Commission appended to this section.
"N. C. Cons AzN;. (Michie, 1931) §4103.
Boyd v. Brooks, 197 N. C. 644, 150 S. E. 178 (1929).
See (1932) 11 N. C. L. Ray. 64, for discussion of the Act and for pro-
posed new statute.
7 7N. C. Const, Art. X, §8; Dalrymple v. Cole, 170 N. C. 102, 86 S. E. 988
(1915).
"N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4101.
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her realty the written assent of her husband.49 But there is the pos-
sibility that even this difficulty may be obviated if the people of this
state will adopt section 8 of article VIII of the new Constitution
recently submitted to them by the General Assembly. 0 This sec-
tion, corresponding to section 6, Article X of the present Constitu-
tion, no longer requires the written assent of the husband to his
wife's conveyances.
Such a statute as we propose would avoid the weakness of the
English law and of the New York statute which leave the fellow
spouse helpless, even as regards the homesite, should the owner de-
cide to dispose of his real property. It would also lack the weak-
ness of the law of those states which sanction inchoate dower and
thus place it in the power of a spouse to render unmarketable the
title to all privately owned real estate. The general effect of the
instant statute is believed to be in keeping .with the growing belief
that the owner of property, whether it be real or personal, should be
left to deal with it with the utmost freedom that is consistent with
the rights of the only other person who could be greatly and imme-
diately concerned with the disposition of the same.
Section 3. All rules and canons of descent of real property and the statute
of distribution of personal property, in so far as they are inconsistent with
this Act, are hereby abolished and repealed.
The purpose of this section is to abolish the two separate statutes
regulating the descent of real property51 and the distribution of
personalty 2 which now obtain in North Carolina, and to clear the
way for the adoption of one uniform system of" rules governing the
devolution of an intestate's property. This would remove North
Carolina from the list of those five states and the District of Co-
lumbia53 which still have separate intestate succession statutes, and
would bring to our law an improvement already made by the remain-
ing forty-three states of this country and by England. 4 We should,
however, mention the fact that of the forty-three states which have
-adopted uniform descent and distribution tables, ten", have retained
"N. C. Const., Art. X, §6.
' P. L. 1933, c. 383.
"N. C. Cons AxN. (Michie, 1931) §1654.
DId., §137.
3Supra note 13.
'Supra note 1.
'Alabama, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See Rep. N. Y. Com., supra note
1, 70.
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some distinction between real and Personal property in connection
with the shares to be taken by the surviving spouse.
The distinction, now existing in our law, between the rules gov-
erning the descent of rep'. property to the heirs and those regulating
the distribution of personal property to the next of kin came to us as
a part of our heritage from England. The distinction between the two
systems is purely historical in its origin. The common law rule of
inheritance of real estate came through the feudal law of England
while the statutes of distribution of personal property were derived
from the Roman law and were in England administered by the Eccle-
siastical Courts and the courts of Chancery until 1857 when the juris-
diction of these matters was transferred to the newly set up Probate
Court.56
The English canons of descent determined at first the inheritance
of real property in terms of those who. could support and defend the
feudal government. Later, under a changed social and economic
order, these same canons of descent v. _ _ employed to keep the great
landed estates intact and in the line of blood whence they came. Out
of this background comes the explanation for the rule of primogen-
iture, of the priority of males over females and of whole-bloods over
half-bloods, of dower and curtesy.
How may we account for the different way in which personal
property was distributed? According to Judge Clark: "At com-
mon law the king took all the personalty, which in that rude age was
usually of very little value; afterwards the crown passed this pre-
rogative to the Church which took all the personalty except the rea-
sonable parts for the widow and the children, and the church officials
claimed to dispose of it in Pios usus. But they were accountable to
no one, and were not even required to pay the debts of the decedent.
By statute 31 Edw. III (A. D. 1358) the churchmen were required
to appoint an administrator who should be next of kin, and this re-
lationship was computed -by the civil law and not by the canon law,
which was used in computing relationship in the descent of land. But
by statute 21 Henry VIII (A. D. 1530) the administrator was ap-
pointed by the Ordinary, and was required to be the widow or next
of kin or both, who, after paying the intestate's debts and the reason-
able parts for the widow and children, retained the surplus in his
own right until the statutes of 22-23 and 29 Charles II (circa 1672
and 1679 A. D.) which required the surplus to be distributed among
M Stockton, supra note 10, at 358.
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the next of kin in the manner provided by those statutes, known as
the "Statute of Distribution."67
In 1784 58 the legislature of North Carolina revised its laws of de-
scent and abolished, among other things, primogeniture and to some
extent the rule of the whole-blood's inheriting to the exclusion of
the half-blood. In 1808 the rules were again revised by a commis-
sion' headed by Judge Gaston and in the same year a new statute of
descents59 pursuant to the recommendations of the commission was
enacted. With slight statutory modifications, North Carolina still
uses today the canons of descent drafted by Judge Gaston in 1808.
Our separate statute of distributions, with some minor changes,
traces its ancestry directly to the old English Statute of Distribution
enacted in the time of Charles II.
It is submitted that the retention of the two distinct systems is
purely arbitrary and productive of an artificial inequality in the
settlement of an estate. Again it is important to observe that wealth
no longer consists chiefly of real property, as it did when our statute
of descents was adopted. It is now largely made up of stocks and
bonds and other securities, but, of course, may include real estate.
The records of the Surrogate Court of New York County disclose
the interesting fact that the estates of 96 per cent of all the persons
who die intestate consist entirely of personal property. 0 As a gen-
eral rule the nature of property owned by a person at his death is a
matter of pure .accident, and it seems illogical that the right of in-
heritance by the spouse, or by the brother and sister, or by the par-
ent of the deceased, no issue surviving, should depend perchance
upon the nature of the property left.
A uniform table of descent and distribution, establishing a sin-
gle class of heirs and next of kin, will eliminate most of the prob-
lems of equitable conversion. It has been well said: "From the
standpoint of the administration of the estate one system of intestate
succession would certainly insure a much more practical and just
distribution. The principle of equitable conversion, which is not
contemplated or understood by the average citizen, would be dis-
carded and could no longer harass an administrator. It would no
longer be possible for the exoneration of realty, recognized at com-
mon law, and in some of our states still not changed -by statute, to
' Wells v. Wells, 158 N. C. 330, 332, 74 S. E. 114, 115 (1912).
'P. L. 1784, c. 225; I Porvrz's RmSAL (1821) c. 204.
'Acts of 1808, c. 739.
'Rep. N. Y. Com, .supra note 1, 8.
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take all the personal property which should have gone to the parent,
in order to give the brother real estate with an unencumbered title.""1
The abolition of the distinction between real and personal prop-
erty, suggested by -this section and the succeeding sections of our
statute, contemplates changes in the present North Carolina law not
only with reference to the devolution of the property of an intestate
but also in regard to the settlement of the estate by the personal rep-
resentative. For instance, no longer would the administrator be
required to exhaust the personal property before any real estate
could be used in the payment of debts. This requirement of the
present law,62 together with those other sections of the statutes which
govern the administration of estates and proceed upon a distinction
between the two types of property,63 would necessarily have to be
amended to conform to the plan of the proposed statute. We pro-
pose to place in the hands of the personal representative the de-
ceased's property-regardless of its nature-to be used under the
supervision of the probate judge in the payment of the debts, and to
be ultimately distributed, according to one uniform table, to the per-
sons designated by the statute as those entitled to take.
Section 4. In intestate succession there shall be no distinction between
real and personal property, or between ancestral and non-ancestral property.
And in the devolution of property there shal be no distinction between rela-
tions of the whole blood and those of the half blood in any case.
Such a statute as the one here proposed would accomplish two
results. In the first place it would wipe out the distinction between
various classes of property for the purposes of inheritance; and, in
the second place, it would greatly simplify the administration of
estates by enabling the administrator and the heirs to look at the
property, whatever its description, simply as property of a given
value, and not as property of a given class subject to a given rule
of law only if it belong to that class, but subject to an entirely dif-
ferent rule if found to belong to another class. Under the statute
here proposed the administrator would not be required to look back
of the intestate in investigating the title to property for the purpose
of administration. At present it may often happen that purchased
property will go to one set of heirs, while ancestral or descended
I
Stockton, supra note 10, at 359.
'IN. C. CoDp ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§74, 136.
' In particular, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§54-57; 66-69; 75-77.
In general, N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) c. 1, arts. 11, 12, 13.
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property will go to another set. This situation cannot be justified
if it be admitted that the purpose of the law is simply to carry an
intestate's property to those closest to him in an effort to provide
for those who piobably would have been the objects of his bounty
had he expressed his wishes in the matter. And it is highly im-
probable that "any decedent, in this day and age, had in mind when
he died, fine-drawn distinctions between ancestral and non-ancestral
land." 4
Certainly it can no longer be contended that now, as in the feudal
period in which the distinctions between the various kinds of prop-
erty and estates originated, the basis of wealth and power is the
landed estate; or that there should now be a system of devolution of
real property which is designed primarily to guarantee fealty and
loyalty to the government, rather than to give the property of a
decedent to those nearest to him.
Undoubtedly, the statutes of a number of the states, including
North Carolina, which distinguish between ancestral and non-
ancestral realty for purposes of devolution trace their ancestry to
the doctrine which originated in the common law rule of descent that
only those collaterals who were of the blood of the "first purchaser"
of the land could inherit. The common law of descent inquired into
the source of thei intestate's title in order to return the land, in the
event of the failure of lineal descendants, to the relatives of the
person who first brought it into the family. 0
However, England, from whence came the notion that descent
must be traced from the first purchaser, has obliterated all distinc-
tions between ancestral and non-ancestral property and has by the
English Law. of Property Act of 1925 provided that both realty
and personalty shall pass to the executor or administrator and shall
be distributed to the same persons. 0 And, in this country at least
twenty-three states 7 make no distinction between ancestral and non-
ancestral realty. The states which have most recently abolished the
Simes, Ancestral and Non-ancestral Realty (1928) 2 CINN. L. REv. 387,
406.
'Note (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 101.
I See ADMIISTRATION OF ESTATES AcT, 15 Geo. V, c. 23 (1925) ; TOPHAM,
NEW LAW OF PROPERTY (3rd ed., 1927) c. XII.
1 Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland.
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio,
New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia,
Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. See digest of statutes of descent in
3 Thompson Real Property (1924), §§2365-2414, for all states except New
York and Ohio.
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distinction are New York 68 and Ohio.69 North Carolina is one of
the six states70 which retain in their intestacy laws rather extensive
provisions regarding ancestral and non-ancestral realty.
Under the present North Carolina law on the failure of lineal
descendants, where the inheritance has been transmitted by descent
from the ancestor, or has been derived by-purchase from the ancestor
by one who in the event of the ancestor's death would have been
his heir or one of his heirs, under the fourth 'canon of descent the
collateral relatives who inherit the estate must be of the blood of
the first purchaser, 71 through whatever intermediate devolution by
descent, gift, or devise it may have passed, and however remote it
may be from the first ancestor.72 Where, however, the inheritance
has not been transmitted by descent or derived as aforesaid from an
ancestor, or if so transmitted or derived, the blood of the ancestor
is extinct, the property will go to the next collateral kindred re-
gardless of the usual rules governing the descent of ancestral prop-
erty.73 Another exception to the rule is also made. The surviving
father or mother of one seized of land, who dies without leaving
issue capable of inheriting, or brothers or sisters or issue of such,
will take the inheritance-under the proviso in the sixth rule of the
canons of descent-without regard to the question whether or not
such parent is of the blood of the ancestor from whom the land de-
scended.7"
The proposed statute would eliminate these ancestral estate laws
and along with them not only the difficult problem of statutory con-
struction but also that of properly applying the statutes to the nu-
merous factual situations that may arise under them. The effect of
IN. Y. Cows. LAvs (Cahill, 1930) c. 13, §§81, 83.
1 Baldwin's Cum. Ohio Code Serv. (March, 1932) §§10503-1.
IN. C. CODE.ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rules 4, 5 and 6; CONN. GEN.
STAT. (1918) §5063; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§3229, 3330; N. J.
ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1925) §57 (5) (6); 1R I. GEN. LAws (1923) §5551;
TENN. CODE (Shannon, 1932) §8380.
N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rule 4.
Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N. C. 650, 75 S. E. 930 (1912). In this respect
North Carolina differs from other jurisdictions retaining the doctrine of an-
cestral estates, which hold that the ancestor from whom the estate must be
traced is the one from whom the property immediately came to the intestate,
rather than the first or original purchaser. See Note (1932) 42 YALE L. J.
101; Note (1916) L. R. A. 1916-C 902, 914 et seq.
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rule 5.7 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rule 6; Weeks v. Quinn, 135 N. C.
425, 47 S. E. 596 (1904).
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the new law would be to cause all property to pass according to one
common rule whatever its character and from whatever source
derived.
Closely bound up with the ancestral estate doctrine in North
Carolina is the question of inheritance by the collateral kindred of
the half-blood, i. e., collateral relatives of the intestate descended
from different spouses of a common ancestor. Under the common
law the doctrine of the whole blood obtained, by which the heirs
of the whole-blood excluded those of the half-blood. In 1784 the
North Carolina legislature enacted that "whereas, it is almost pe-
culiar to the law of Great Britain and founded in principles of the
feudal system, which no longer apply to that government and can
never apply to this state, that the half-blood should be excluded
from the inheritance, the lands of an intestate .. .shall descend
to .. .as well those of the half-blood as those of the whole-blood,
as tenants in common."'75 This law, in its essence, has continued in
force in this state since 1784 and is to be found today in Rule 6 of
the canons of descent to the effect that "collateral relations of the
half-blood shall inherit equally with those of the whole blood." 76
However, Rule 6 must be construed with Rule 4 regarding the
inheritance by collaterals of ancestral estates, 77 and when so con-
strued, it has been held, the collateral relations of the half-blood
inherit equally with those of the whole blood only when the
former are of the blood of the ancestor from whom the estate
was derived.73 Rule 5 modifies the harshness of this construction
by expressly providing for inheritance by kindred not of the blood
of the ancestor in default of kindred of his blood.79
In a state such as North Carolina where the distinction between
half-blood and whole blood relations has been abolished by law, but
that between ancestral and non-ancestral is continued in full force,
it will be found that, as a practical matter, the latter rule works in
such a way as to seriously impair the former. A study of the North
Carolina cases indicates that the rule requiring that real property
shall be kept in the blood of the purchasing ancestor is seldom in-
'1 Porr's RmISAL (1821) 465, c. 204, §3.
N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rule 6.7 Supra note 71.
" Dozier v. Grandy, 66 N. C. 484 (1872) ; Paul v. Carter, 153 N. C. 26, 68
S. E. 905 (1910).19Supra note 73.
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yoked for any other purpose than to cut out half-blood relations of
the intestate.80
In thirteen states which distribute realty and personalty without
regard to the source of the intestate's title, kindred of the half-blood
take equally with those of the whole blood of the same degree of
consanguinity.81
It is believed that our proposed statute, which, for devolution
purposes, abolishes all distinctions between real and personal prop-
erty and between ancestral and non-ancestral realty and between
relations of the whole blood and those of the half-blood in any case,
will not only greatly facilitate the effective administration of intestate
estates but also will be productive of results socially desirable in the
light of modern American conditions.
Section 5. All real and personal property of a person dying intestate shall
vest in the administrator to be distributed after the payment of all lawful
claims and debts against the estate in the following manner:
i. If there be no surviving spouse, to the children of such intestate or
their lineal descendants, per stirpes.
ii. If there be a surviving spouse and one child, or its lineal descendants
surviving, one-half to the surviving spouse and the remainder to the child,
or its lineal descendants, per stirpes.
iii. If there be a spouse and more than one child, or their lineal descendants
surviving, one-third to the surviving spouse and the remainder to the children
equally, or to the descendants of any deceased child, per stirpes.
iv. If there be no children, or their lineal descendants, three-fourths to
the surviving spouse and one-fourth to the parents of the intestate equally, or
the surviving parent; if there be no parents, then the whole to the surviving
spouse.
v. If there be no spouse, and no children or their lineal descendants, to the
parents of the intestate equally, or to the survivor of such parents.
vi. If there be no spouse, no children or their lineal descendants, and no
surviving parent, to the brothers and sisters of the intestate, or their lineal
descendants, per stirpes.
I See, for instance, Dozier v. Grandy, 66 N. C. 484 (1872) ; Wilkerson v.
Bracken, 24 N. C. 315 (1842); Little v. Buie, 58 N. C. 10 (1859) ; Paul v.
Carter, 153 N. C. 26, 68 S. E. 905 (1910) ; Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N. C. 650.
75 S. E. 930 (1912) ; Noble v. Williams, 167 N. C. 112, 83 S. E. 180 (1914).
"ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith Hurd, 1931) c. 39, §1; IOwA CODE (1931) §§
11986-12040; KAN. Rnv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 22, §128; ME. REv. STAT.
(1930) c. 89, §§l, 2, 20; MAss. GN. LAWS (1921) c. 190, §§1-4; N. H. Pu.
LAws (1926) c. 307, §§1-19; N..M. STAT. ANN. (1929) c. 38, §§101-120;
N. Y. CoNs. LAWs (Cahill, 1930) c. 13, §§81, 83; Onio GEN. CODE ANN.
(Page Supp., 1932) §§10503-1, 10503-4; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) c. 10.
§§101, 102, 203; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) c. 20, §§62, 75; VT. GEN.
LAWS (1917) §§3416, 3417; WASH. CQMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) §§1341,
1347, 1364.
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vii. If there be no spouse and no parents or their lineal descendants, to the
grandparents of the intestate equally, or the survivor or survivors of such
grandparents.
viii If there be no such grandparent or grandparents, then to the uncles
and aunts, or their lineal descendants, per stirpes.
ix. If there be no persons of the classes contained in the preceding 8 sub-
sections, then to the next of kin, in equal degrees, as determined by the rules of
the civil law, without representation.
x. If there be no surviving spouse or blood relatives, to the stepchildren of
the intestate or their lineal descendants per stirpes; if no stepchildren or their
lineal descendants, then to the step-parents of the intestate.
xi. If there be no step-children or their lineal descendants or step-parent,
then to the surviving spouse of any deceased child of the intestate. If there
be no such surviving spouse of a deceased child, then to the next of kin of
any deceased spouse of the intestate.
xiL. If there be no such next of kin of the deceased spouse, then to the State
of North Carolina.
This section proposes that for the purpose of administering an
intestate's estate, the title to both real and personal property shall
vest in the administrator and shall constitute assets for the pay-
ment of the decedent's debts. It proposes that the law be carried
further in disregard of the distinction between the two broad classes
of property than has been attempted in any other jurisdiction ex-
cept England. In that country under the provisions of the English
Administration of Estates Act of 192582 the title to the real estate
of a deceased person devolves upon his personal representative in
the same manner as the personal property, and, for purposes of
settling the estate, it may be managed, disposed of to pay debts, or
distributed to the heirs by the personal representative in practically
the same manner as the personal property is handled. No American
state has gone this far. New York, with admittedly one of the
most modern probate codes in this country, while not vesting title
to the realty in the personal representative, has granted a statutory
power of sale over real estate to an executor and to a trustee, as
well as the power to mortgage and to lease, but in all instances to
be exercised only upon the approval of the surrogate, and where it
has not been prohibited by a testator in his will. New York has
also made an additional grant of power to an administrator of
the management of realty, with a power of sale, mortgage or lease
for estate purposes, subject to the control of the surrogate.8 3 That
=15 GEo. V, c. 23.
SN. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 13, §123; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
Surr. Ct. Act, (Cahill, 1931) art. 13.
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state has also simplified the procedure for the sale of real estate by
a personal representative.
While in its preliminary draft of a proposed new probate act for
Florida, the State Bar Association Committee recommended that the
title to the real estate of a decedent, like personal property, should
vest in his administrator for the benefit of his heirs and creditors,8 4
the final draft of the proposed act 5 shows that the committee has
receded from its original position. It is now recommended that the
personal representative shall take only possession of all the estate
of a decedent, real and personal (except homestead), together with
all the rents, income, and profits accruing therefrom by virtue of
lease, mortgage or sale; and that all such property and the rents,
income, and profits therefrom shall be assets in the hands of the
personal representative for the payment of debts and for the settle-
ment of the estate.8 6
The statute we propose would be similar in its operation to the
English law. Radical though it may seem, we believe that it would
greatly simplify the administration of estates. It would operate to
the advantage of those taking under the proposed intestacy statute
in that it would enable the administrator to sell either or both kinds
of property when to do so would benefit the estate, or to sell one
kind of property when it would be advantageous to do so in order
to raise funds to take care of the other. And, under the statute,
the administrator, subject to the approval of the probate court, could
sell and mortgage realty in the proper administration and distribu-
tion of the estate; thus wotild be obviated the experise and delay
incident to the separate special proceedings that now must be brought
to sell land to make assets or for partition.
Certainly it is not to be contended that the administrator who can
be trusted with the highly liquid assets of the estate, such as
cash, stocks, bonds, and negotiable paper cannot be trusted with
land. It would be more difficult to defraud the estate in the sale of
land, with the attendant necessity of recording all instruments that
affect the title thereto, than it would be to defraud it in the disposal
of such forms of personal property as those enumerated above. And
it is also true- that the person of average business experience has
no more difficulty in understanding the real estate market well
enough to dispose of the land to advantage, or more wisely, than
See notes 7 and 8 supra.
(1932) 6 FLA. ST. BAR AssN. J. 511-550.
(1932) 6 FLA. ST. BAR ASSN. J. 530, §105.
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he would have in understanding the stock or bond market well
enough to dispose of such securities in an intelligent way. It is
true that the personal property is more readily disposed of than is
the real property of an estate, but that is no argument for throwing
an additional difficulty in the way of the disposition of the land.
Under the present law of North Carolina, title to real property
vests in the heir immediately upon the death of the ancestor, while
the title to personalty vests in the personal representative pending
the fihal settlement of the estate and distribution to the heirs or next
of kin. And pending such settlement all parties concerned are
harassed by all the vexatious problems of equitable conversion and
exoneration of the heirs, which problems must necessarily arise under
the existing laws. This section is designed to further minimize
such problems by treating all property alike and by compelling the
persons who succeed to intestate property to count their rights
therein in terms of valuation alone rather than according to the acci-
dental circumstance of being an heir to one class of *property or
another.
Since sections 3 and 4 of the proposed statute would obviously
repeal North Carolina's two separate statutes8 7 regulating the descent
of real property and the distribution of personalty, section 5 of the
proposed statute is designed to replace the two systems and to
present in their stead one uniform system of rules governing the
devolution of an intestate's estate.
In the various subsections of the statute an attempt has been
made to keep the property as close as possible to the intestate in
order to care first for those who would have been the natural ob-
jects of his bounty had he expressed his wishes in the matter of the
disposition of his estate during his lifetime. In thus concentrating
the estate in the nearer and more dependent relatives the statute
follows the example set by the modern intestate succession laws of
England, New York,8 8 and..Ohio.8 9
On the accompanying page will be found comparative tables
which indicate, graphically, the distribution of an intestate's estate
under the present North Carolina, New York, and English statutes,
and under the proposed new statute for North Carolina. These
'Notes 51 and 52, supra.
' For an excellent analysis and comparison of the English and New York
statutes, see STEPHENSON, ENGLISH EXECUTOR AND TRUSTEE BUSINESS, c. VII.
"CuAt. OHIO CODE SERviCE (Baldwin, March, 1932) §§10503-1 through
10503-22.
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tables (with the exception of the last column to the right) were pre-
pared by Messrs. Richard G. Stockton and Lawrence Watt by whose
permission they are reproduced herewith.
It will be noticed that the first subsection of the proposed statute
gives all the property to the children or lineal descendants of the
intestate if there be no surviving spouse, which is exactly what would
happen under Rule 1 of the North Carolina canons of descent 90 and
under subsection 4 of the statute of distribution.9 1Subsection two divides the property between the surviving spouse
and the only child*of the intestate, because it would seem that these
two people should have the property between them, their relation-
ship to the intestate being such that normally they would he equally
the objects of his affection and bounty. But if there are two chil-
dren or more, subsection three fixes the share of the spouse at one-
third of the total estate, because upon such survivor devolves the
responsibility of the care and support of the children. It would
hardly seem reasonable to cut down the means of adequately dis-
charging this responsibility .indefinitely in proportion to the number
of charges under it. And if the children are of such age that they
will no longer look to the surviving parent for support, then said
parent will have reached that stage in life which would call for such
a share in the property of the deceased as will most nearly insure to
the parent an independent and comfortable old age.
It must be remembered that the share of the surviving spouse
indicated in these subsections is in lieu of curtesy, dower, and all
other rights, estates, and exemptions enjoyed by him under the pres-
ent law of this state. We have already pointed out the inadequacy
of the marital estates of dower and curtesy and their unfairness to
the surviving spouse. Our statute follows the trend of modern in-
testacy legislation in giving to the surviving spouse-whether hus-
band or wife-an outright fee simple interest in all the property,
the share. depending somewhat upon the number of children sur-
viving the intestate. England, Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio,
have recently revised their laws to effectuate this end.
We look upon the marital relation today as a real partnership in'
which each partner in his own way is helping to accumulate and pre-
serve a common estate. Upon the death of either partner intestate
it seems only fair and just that the survivor should take outright a
'ON. C. Cons ANx. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rule 1.91 Id., §137, subsec. 4.
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definite portion of the estate--certainly in preference to the collateral
kindred of the deceased.
Under the present North Carolina law the surviving spouse may
inherit real property from the intestate only if there are no other
heirs capable of taking.92 The effect of this rule may be illustrated
by the case of Powers v. Kite,93 in which the Supreme Court held
that upon the death of an illegitimate son (intestate, married, and
without issue) leaving a legitimate half sister, born of the same
mother, his real estate descended to such sister to the exclusion of
the son's widow.94
Under the statute of distributions the widow takes one-third of
the personalty of the intestate if there are not more than two chil-
dren; a child's part if. there are more than two children; and only
one-half if there are no children at all.9 5 The surviving husband,
however, gets all of his wife's personal property, after the payment
of her just debts, if there are no children; and he takes a child's
part whenever there are children or their legal representatives.96
Note the difference between husband and wife so far as taking per-
sonal property under the present law is concerned. If the husband
leaves a wife and one child, the wife takes one-third and the child
two-thirds; if the wife leaves a husband and one child, the husband
takes one-half and the child one-half. Under the proposed statute
no distinction is made between real and personal property or in the
share taken by the surviving spouse-whether husband or wife.
The proposed law provides that in the absence of children, the
surviving spouse will divide the estate with the parents of the in-
testate, the parents taking one-fourth. But in case the parents are
dead, the spouse will be allowed to take all to the exclusion of all
other kindred. If there is no spouse but surviving parents, then the
parents will take the whole estate-collateral kindred inheriting the
property, if at all, only through the parents, or in the absence of
parents. In the absence of parents the collateral kindred will take
in the following order: brothers and sisters, grandparents, uncles
and aunts; then any next of kin of whatsoever class as determined by
the civil law. Each class takes to the exclusion of all subsequent
classes except in those classes in which representation is allowed.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rule 8.
83 N. C. 156 (1880).
See also Bryant v. Bryant, 190 N. C. 372, 130 S. E. 21 (1925).
SN. C. CODE ANN. (Michier 1931) §137, subsecs. 1, 2, 3.9 Id., §§7, 137, subsec. 8; Mclver v. McKinney, 184 N. C. 393, 114 S. E.
399 (1922).
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Under the present law parents can inherit realty from their chil-
dren if such children die leaving no issue, nor brother nor sister, nor
issue of such, and without regard to whether or not the property was
ancestral.97 As to personalty, if in the lifetime of its father and
mother, a child dies intestate, without leaving husband, wife or child,
or the issue of a child, its estate is equally divided between the father
and mother. If one of the parents is dead at the time of the death
of the child, the surviving parent takes all the personalty.98
This proposal carries the possibility of distribution much further
than any law now in existence in any American jurisdiction in that
after the blood of the intestate has become extinct the property will
be distributed to the step-children, 99 step-parents, and finally to the
next of kin of a deceased spouse before escheat to the state is al-
lowed. This makes the possibility of such escheat very remote
indeed.
It will be noticed also that this statute provides for the determina-
tion of the next of kin of the deceased by the rule of the civil law.
This changes the present North Carolina law which provides that
the degrees of relationship shall be computed by the rules which pre-
vaii in descents at common law.10 0 North Carolina is almost alone
in this respect; the rule generally adopted in most jurisdictions is
that of the civil law.1° 1
Section 6. There shall be no right of representation among lineal or col-
lateral kindred of an equal degree of consanguinity, such kindred in all cases
being required to take per capita. Among collateral kindred there shall be no
right of representation among those further removed than the children of
brothers and sisters of the intestate.
Since this section would make some radical changes in the present
North Carolina law, it might be well to make a brief statement of
the law as it now stands. At present, under the rules governing the
descent of real property, the right of representation is indefinite,
as well among collateral as lineal kindred.' 0 2 And in the descent of
real estate the lineal descendants stand in the same place as their an-
9 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rule 6; Weeks v. Quinn, 135
N. C. 425, 47 S. E. 496 (1904).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §137, subsec. 6.
The new intestacy statute of New York carries the distribution to this
extent. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 13, §83, subsec. 14. So does
Ohio: Cum. OHIO CODE SEavlcn (Baldwin, March, 1932) §§105034 (9).
10 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rule 6.
13 THomPsox, REAL PROPERTY (1924) §2338.
21 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rules 1, 3, 4; Johnson v. Chesson,
59 N. C. 146 (1860).
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cestor and together take what he would take if alive, i. e., they take
per stirpes. Also, the next collateral relations of the person last
seized take realty per stirpes and not per capita.10 3
Under the Revised Code of 1854104 in the distribution of the
personal property there was admitted among collateral kindred no
representation after brothers' and sisters' children.' 0 5 Our present
statute of distributions allows representation among collateral to same
extent as in the descent of real property.1 6 Where a fund consists
solely of personalty and the claimants at the time of the intestate's
death are all in equal degree the next of kin of the intestate, the
statute of distribution requires that the fund be distributed per
capita.107 Representation in this kind of property-that is, descent
per stirpes-when allowed, is resorted to only when it is necessary
to bring the claimants to equality of position as next of kin. (It
is otherwise as to realty),108 If, for instance, A dies leaving four
grandchildren-three children of a deceased son and one child of a
deceased daughter-each grandchild takes one-fourth of the per-
sonalty because they are all of equal degree. But if A leaves one
daughter and three grandchildren, children of a deceased son, the
daughter takes one-half and each grandchild one-sixth.' 0 9 In the
foregoing illustration if the property to be distributed had been
realty instead of personalty, the one child of the deceased daughter
would have taken one-half of the property and the children of the
deceased son would have divided the other one-half amongst them,
each taking one-sixth. This division of the realty would obtain
under our present law although the grandchildren were collateral re-
lations of an equal degree of consanguinity, with each grandchild
equally near and dear to the intestate.
The instant proposal, by following the general pattern of our
suggested statute which abolishes all distinction between real and
personal property, would eliminate some of the confusion and
inequality now prevailing under the present laws regarding the dis-
tribution of the various types of property of an intestate. This sec-
Clement v. Cauble, 55 N. C. 82 (1854) ; Haynes v. Johnston, 58 N. C.
124 (1859) ; Crump v. Faucett, 70 N. C. 345 (1874).1 RE v. CODE, c. 64, §§1 and 2.
"See Johnston v. Chesson, 59 N. C. 146 (1860).
116 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §137, subsecs. 3, 4, 5; Moore v. Rankin,
172 N. C. 599, 90 S. E. 759 (1916).
Ellis v. Harrison, 140 N. C. 444, 53, S. E. 299 (1906).
' Supra note 107.
' ELLER AND STEPHENSON, Gun -Poss IN PREPARING WILLS (2d ed.,
1925) 8 and 9.
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tion purports to state the law applicable to both kinds of property
and to state it in such a manner as will keep the property in the
hands of those to whom the intestate would probably have given it
had he expressed his wishes and yet will protect it against too minute
sub-division among a great number of distant collateral relations by
depriving those more than three degrees removed of any right of
representation.
The first part of the proposed section would distribute all prop-
erty, both real and personal to all kindred of an equal degree of
consanguinity per capita. This would embody the rule now obtain-
ing in North Carolina regarding personalty when it is not necessary
to bring the claimants to equality of position as next of kin."10 And
even if the intestate should leave, for instance, one son living and
two grandchildren by a deceased daughter and four grandchildren
-by a deceased son, our statute would give one-third of the property
to the surviving son and would distribute the remaining two-thirds
per capita-one-ninth each-to the six grandchildren who are of an
equal degree of consanguinity.
"If one dies leaving seven children, natural feeling suggests that
they should share his estate equally, because they are all his children;
and so if one leaves as his next of kin seven grandchildren, the same
feeling suggests that they should share his estate equally, because
they are all his grandchildren-equally near to him, and for that
reason presumed to be equally the objects of his affection without
reference to the fact that some of his children, all of whom are
dead, were blessed with more children than the others; for our affec-
tions, and the law which follows them, deal with the living and not
with the dead. For the same reasons, if one leaves as his next of
kin seven nieces and nephews, natural feeling suggests that they
should share his estate equally, in the absence of anything to show
that he intended to give a preference to those whose parents had
the fewest number of children." So argued Judge Pearson as early
as 1854 in a brilliant and vigorous dissent filed by him in the cel-
ebrated case of Clement v. Cauble.xl" That case decided that in the
descent of real estate the next collateral relations of the person last
seized, who are of equal degree, take per stirpes and not per capita.
The reason for the old English rules of representation among
collateral kindred in the descent of real property was the necessity,
'
1 Supra notes 107 and 108.
m 55 N. C. 82, 95 (1854).
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under the feudal system, for finding the person among the kinsmen
of the deceased who would make the best soldier. The rules of de-
scent did not have as their basis the equitable distribution of the
estate to those most nearly connected with the deceased by the ties
of nature. The legislature of this state has expressly recognized the
fact that the reason for the rule no longer exists here and has long
since abolished primogeniture and the preference of males over
females; therefore the related rule of representation among collateral
kindred of an equal degree should also be discarded as having no
longer a place in our law.
We might mention here that Ohio allows no representation among
the next of kin.112 The rule prevailing in America is to the effect
that if the descendants, either lineal or collateral, stand in an equal
degree from the common ancestor, they will take the inheritance
per capita; but if they stand in unequal degree, they will take per
stirpes.113
While the right of representation is firmly imbedded in our juris-
prudence and is eminently just in certain situations where close rel-
atives would be left without a right to participate in the distribution
of an estate but for it, yet it would seem to be good policy to reason-
ably limit the right as among the remote relatives of the deceased
so as to prevent too minute a subdivisioft of the estate. To this end,
therefore, we propose in the second pait of section six to limit the
right of representation among collateral kindred to the children of
brothers and sisters of the intestate. This would amount to our
adoption of a rule, applicable to the distribution of both-realty and
personalty, which prevailed in North Carolina as to personalty until
1863 when it was repealed by the legislature.11 4
Under the statutes of descent and distribution in a number of
states, it has been held that no representation shall be admitted among
collaterals after brothers' and sisters' children or descendants."15
New York now expressly provides by statute that no representation
"'CuCM. OHIO CODE SERVIcE (Baldwin, March, 1932) §§10503-4 (8).
"3 3 THO sN, REAL PROPERTY (1924) §2340.
"'Laws 1862-63, c. 18.
n'Ector v. Grant, 112 Ga. 557, 37 S. E. 984, 53 L. R. A. 723 (1901);
Quinby v. Higgins, 14 Me. 309 (1837) ; McComas v. Amos, 29 Md. 132 (1868) ;
Conant v. Kent, 130 Mass. 178 (1881); Clary v. Watkins, 64 Nebr. 386, 89
N. W. 1042 (1902) ; Davis v. Vanderveer, 23 N. J. Eq. 558 (1872) ; Page v.
Parker, 61 N. H. 65 (1881). See also 3 THOMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY (1924)
§2339.
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shall be admitted among collaterals after brothers' and sisters' de-
scendants."16
Section 7. Illegitimate children shall inherit from their mother, from their
maternal kindred in all degrees, and from each other and the descendants of
each other as fully as if born in wedlock. But when the parents of an illegiti-
mate child shall marry subsequent to its birth, it shall be deemed to have been
made legitimate for all purposes of this statute.
By both the common and civil law the most important disability
under which an illegitimate labored was that he possessed no in-
heritable blood and was incapable of becoming heir to either his
father or mother or to any one else; nor could he transmit in-
heritance, save only to heirs born of his own body.'1 7 The rigor
of these early rules as to the status of bastards has been considerably
mollified by statutory enactment in North Carolina. By the law
of this state illegitimates may now inherit realty from their mother,
except as to realty conveyed or devised to the mQther by the father
of her legitimate children; but illegitimate children and their issue
are excluded from inheriting from the lineal or collateral kindred of
their mother when they claim through their mother by representa-
tion.1 8 Also, as between illegitimate childrea and their repre-
sentatives they are considered legitimate and their estates descend
in the same manner as if they had been born in wedlock; and if an
illegitimate child dies without issue, his mother may inhei'it from
him."19 And, as Dean Mordecai says, "We have gone so far as to
pay them the compliment of permitting their legitimate brothers and
sisters to inherit from them."' 20 Uider our statute of distributions
regarding personal property, illegitimates are considered among the
next of kin to their mother and to each other.121
The first part of the proposed section would further lighten the
burden of illegitimates by permitting them to inherit, by representing
their mother, from their maternal kindred either lineal or collateral.
In other words, they would be allowed to take through their mother
as well as from her as, if they were legitimate. Thus the bastard
would be given a right in the property of those who are most prop-
erly and most certainly to be regarded as its relatives. Of course
IhN. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 13, §83 (10).
13 THoMPsON, REAL PROPERTY (1924) §2348.
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rule 9.
Id., §1654, rule 10.
311 MoRDEcAI, LAw LEcTuRns (2d ed. 1916) 647; McBryde v. Patterson, 78
N. C. 412 (1878).
Ix N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §140.
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this would directly change that part of Rule 9 of our canons of de-
scent which prohibits an illegitimate child froih representing its
mother in claiming her part of the estate derived from her kin-
dred.1 2 2 Inheritance by illegitimates to the extent proposed by us
seems to be allowed in Indiana, 23 Iowa,124 and Massachusetts. 12 5
The last part of the proposed section is in effect but a restate-
ment of the present law providing for the legitimation of the bastard
by the subsequent marriage of the parents. 28
Section 8. Any child of an intestate born withinj ten lunar months of the
death of its father shall have the same rights in his estate as if born within
his lifetime.
This section is, in effect, a restatement in another form of the
present North Carolina law.' 27
Section 9. When a child shall have been legally adopted, it shall inherit
as a natural child from its adoptive parents, but from its natural parents only
when there is no other next of kin of such parents. The natural parents of
such child shall inherit from it only when there is no other next of kin of such
child or its adoptive parents.
This section would revamp considerably the prevailing North
Carolina law. Under our law today if the child has been adopted
for life and the person adopting dies intestate, the child may inherit
both the realty and personalty of the deceased adopting parent
in the same manner and to the same extent that such child would
have inherited had it been the actual child of the person adopting
it.128 Nor does there appear to be anything in our law to prevent
such adopted child from inheriting also from its natural parents.
Where an adopted child dies seized of realty, without brothers and
sisters, and the property is claimed by both the natural and adopted
fathers, the law confers it upon the natural father under our general
statutes of descent.' 2 9  (In this respect North Carolina seems to
follow the prevailing view in America to the effect that natural
parents inherit to the exclusion of adoptive parents). 30 However,
'Note 118 supra.
Parks v. Kimes, 100 Ind. 148 (1884).
Johnson v. Bodine, 108 Ia. 594, 79 N. W. 348 (1899).
'Hayden v. Barrett, 172 Mass. 472, 52 N. E. 530, 70 Am. St. 259 (1899).
'1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §279.
1'Id., §1654, rule 7.
SId., §185.
' Edwards v. Yearby, 168 N. C. 663, 85 S. E. 19 (1915).
See Dodson v. Ward, 31 N. M. 54, 240 Pac. 991, 42 A. L. R. 521 (1925);
noted in (1926) 12 VA. L. RIv. 311.
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when an adopted child dies intestate. leaving no husband or wife or
child .or issue of child, North Carolina permits the adopted parents
to take the child's personal property the same as if they were natural
parents.13 1 Except in the case just stated, an adopted child's prop-
erty, upon intestacy, will escheat to the state before it will go to
the adopting parents, even though they may have reared the child
from babyhood and lavished upon it all the care which its natural
parents either would not or could not give it.
Our proposed statute goes further perhaps than any prevailing
American law in permitting the adopted child and adoptive parents
to inherit from each other.
In view of the legal relationship set up by adoption and of the
rights, duties, and obligations flowing therefrom governing 'the
adoptive parent and the adopted child, it would seem that in the eyes
of the law these persons should be regarded in all respects as par-
ent and child. The legal status existing between natural parent and
child having been materially altered by the adoption process, it
would seem anomalous, to say the least, to permit the natural parent,
who has given up the custody and support of the child to the adoptive
parent who has assumed such responsibilities, to inherit the deceased
child's property to the exclusion of the adopting parent.
Because, however, of the blood-ties existing between natural
parent and child, we thought it better to allow the natural parent
to inherit from his child-and vice-versa, than through failure of
those entitled to take, permit the property to escheat to the state.
Section 10. When any parent shall have wilfully abandoned his child or
his or her spouse has obtained custody of the child under order of court grant-
ing a divorce on the ground of abandonment or extreme cruelty, the parent
guilty of such misconduct shall lose all right to succeed to any part of the
child's estate should it die intettate. Provided, that when it can be shown
that the parent.has contributed regularly to the support of the child by order
of the court, through alimony or otherwise, his right to participate in the
estate of the child shall not be defeated under the provisions of this section.
It is intended that this section should serve the same purpose in
our statute as the proviso in subsection 6 of section 137 of the Con-
solidated Statutes. That proviso was added by the legislature in
1927132 to obviate, in future cases, the result reached by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in the case of Avery v. Brantley,13 3 which
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §137, subsec. 6.
P. L. 1927, c. 231.
191 N. C. 396, 131 S. E. 721 (19Z6) ; noted in (1926) 5 N. C. L. Rnv. 72.
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was decided in 1926. In that case the father of a child had aban-
doned her and her mother after conviction for assault upon the
mother. The wife afterwards divorced the husband and cared for
the child until its death. When the mother recovered damages for
the wrongful death of the child, the father claimed under Consol-
idated Statutes, section 137, subsection 6, one-half the intestate
child's estate. It was held that he was entitled to recover, the
statute declaring that a parent who abandons a child and leaves its care
and custody to others shall forfeit all his rights with respect to
the care, custody and services of such child 134 not applying to the
situation. The proposed section would prevent a parent, as an un-
worthy beneficiary, from inheriting from an abandoned child who
has died intestate.
Section 11. No gift shall be deemed to have been made as an advancement
unless so expressed in writing or charged in writing, by the intestate, as an
advancement, or acknowledged in writing by the donee.
In its legal sense, and as employed in the law' of descent and dis-
tribution, an advancement is an irrevocable gift in praesenti of
money or property, real or personal, to a child by a parent to enable
the donee to anticipate his inheritance to the extent of the gift. 3 5
By the present North Carolina law children of parents who die in-
testate are charged with, and must account for, all advancements,
both of realty and of personalty.' 3 6 In the determination of the
question whether a transfer of property from parent to child is a
gift, a sale, or an advancement, the intention of the grantor is the
controlling element. And only such intention as exists at the time
of the transaction is to be considered.' 3 7  Under the present law, in
the absence of direct evidence of the intention of the donor at the
time of the gift, such intention must be gathered from the nature
of the gift and the circumstances under which it was made-to
show which parol evidence is competent. 138 Presumptions are also
resorted to in determining whether or not an advancement was in-
tended. Thus a substantial gift of property.by a parent to his child,
or a conveyance of land in consideration of love and affection or of a
nominal sum, is ordinarily presumed to be an advancement, and the
burden of proof is on the grantee or donee to show that an advance-
'. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §189.18 C. J. 911.
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1654, rule 2; §§138, 139.
Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N. C. 207, 111 S. E. 180 (1922).
1Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C. 456, 26 S. E. 38 (1896).
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ment was not intended.13 9 But if the transfer is made for a val-
uable and adequate consideration, there is no presumption of an ad-
vancement but rather the contrary; the burden then to prove it an
advancement is upon the person claiming it to be such.
140
In order to remove some of the indefiniteness and uncertainty
now prevailing in our law as to whether or not an advancement is
intended in a particular transaction, we propose that no gift shall be
deemed to have been made as an advancement unless so expressed
or charged as such in writing by the donor, or acknowledged as such
in writing by the donee. It will still be a question of intention, but
the proposed statute will have prescribed the manner of proof of the
intention. Necessarily, under such a statute, the courts would have
to exclude parol evidence if such evidence were offered to show an
advancement. They would also have to hold that an advancement
not in writing was, in legal effect, no advancement at all unless the
heirs and distributees waived the statutory requirement.
141
About nine states142 in this country have adopted advancement
statutes similar to the one we herewith propose.
Section 12. If the beneficiary of such advancement dies in the lifetime of
the intestate, his descendants shall, to the extent of the advancement, be barred
from participation in the estate of the donor or grantor of the advancement
to the same extent and upon the same conditions as would the beneficiary of
the advancement had be survived the donor.
This section, provides, in effect, that in the division of an intestate
grandparent's estate, the grandchildren must account for advancements
made to their deceased parent, as the representatives of such a parent,
before they can participate in the estate of the grandparent. In
other words, where a grandchild takes, by way of representation, his
deceased parent's share of the grandfather's estate, such grandchild
takes the share subject to any advancements made to his deceased
parent during the latter's lifetime. This is substantially the present
law in North Carolina.' 4 3 As a general proposition, the grandchild
'Nobles v. Davenport, supra note 137; Kiger v. Terry, supra note 138.
240Supra note 139.
- 18 C. J. 919.
:"California: CAL. PROB. CoDn'(Deering, 1931) §1050; Illinois: 3 ILL. STAT.
ANN. (Callaghan, 1924) c. 39 §7; Maine: ME. Rxv. STAT. (1930) c. 89, §4;
Massachusetts: 2 MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 196 §5; Michigan: 3 Micn.
Comp. LAWS (1929) §13448; Nebraska: NEB. Compe. STAT. (1922) §1234; New
Hampshire: 2 N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) c. 307, §§14, 15; Rhode Island: R. I.
GEN. LAws (1923) §5568; Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. (1931) §318.27.
' Headen v. Headen, 42 N. C. 159 (1850) ; Skinner v. Wynne, 55 N. C. 41
(1854) ; Crump v. Faucett, 70 N. C. 345 (1874).
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has already received, indirectly at least, the benefit of any advance-
ment made to his living parent.
We submit this proposed intestate succession statute to the mem-
bers of the legal profession of North Carolina for their thoughtful
study and consideration. It is hoped that this statute, together with
our comments thereon, will serve to focus the attention of the bench
and bar upon the necessity for a critical re~xamination of the utility
of the existing intestacy laws of the state and upon the desirability
of modernizing them along the lines suggested to the end that they
may best subserve the needs of a new social and economic order.
